

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00376 01 OF 02 041134Z

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 IO-04 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /074 W

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P R 0410005Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 575

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 114

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USSALT TWO GENEVA 006

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0376

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD OCT
28-NOV 3, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE EAST CONTINUED TO PRESS ITS
INITIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL DURING THEIR WEEK OF THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV OFFICIALLY INTRO-
DUCED THE PROPOSAL AT THE OCT 31 ANNIVERSARY PLENARY
MEETING. DURING THE OCT 29 INFORMAL AND IN BILATERALS,
EASTERN REPS STRESSED THE COMPROMISE CHARACTER OF THEIR
FIRST STEP PROPOSAL AND THEIR FLEXIBILITY ON DETAILS,

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00376 01 OF 02 041134Z

BUT PRESENTED NO NEW ELEMENTS. AT THE INFORMAL

KHLESTOV ALSO SOUGHT IN A CAREFULLY PREPARED STATEMENT TO SHELVE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE GROUND FORCE REDEFINITION ISSUE. AFTER DISCUSSING FUTURE NEGOTIATING TACTICS, THE AD HOC GROUP (AHG) CONFIRMED ITS EARLIER DECISION TO STEER FUTURE INFORMAL MEETINGS TOWARD CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMON CEILING GOAL AND ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, VIA CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE REDEFINITION AND, GIVEN EARLY NATO GUIDANCE, DISCUSSION OF NON-INCREASE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, BUT WITHOUT FORMALLY DROPPING THE TOPIC OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. END SUMMARY.

2. THE NEW EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL REMAINED THE MAIN TOPIC OF DISCUSSION IN THE VIENNA TALKS THIS WEEK. AT THE OCT 31 PLENARY MEETING, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, SOVIET REP KHLESTOV INTRODUCED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IN EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS AS PRESENTED BY EASTERN REPS AT THE OCT 15 INFORMAL MEETING. KHLESTOV SAID THAT A FIRST STEP APPROACH WAS NECESSARY TO BREAK THE ICE IN VIENNA AFTER A YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SOUGHT TO TAKE WESTERN INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT.

3. DURING THE OCT 29 INFORMAL AND IN SOME BILATERALS THIS WEEK, EASTERN REPS SOUGHT TO EXTOL THE VIRTUES OF THEIR INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, ADVANCING WHAT HAS BECOME THE STANDARD CASE FOR THEIR PROPOSAL ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) THE VIENNA TALKS WERE DEADLOCKED;
(B) BOTH SIDES WISHED FORWARD MOVEMENT;
(C) IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND SOME COMPROMISE APPROACH TO MOVE THE TALKS;
(D) THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL IS THE VEHICLE FOR SUCH A COMPROMISE;
(E) THE EAST HAS TAKEN WESTERN INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT IN DEVELOPING THIS PROPOSAL;
(F) IN RESPONSE TO THESE INTERESTS, EAST HAS AGREED THAT THE US AND USSR CAN IMPLEMENT THEIR REDUCTIONS FIRST, AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE PRINCIPLE THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT SHOULD UNDERTAKE REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO ITS TOTAL SHARE OF EACH SIDE, BY AGREEING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00376 01 OF 02 041134Z

THAT THE US AND USSR EACH WOULD TAKE 10,000 REDUCTIONS;
(G) THE EAST HAD ALSO COMPLIED WITH THE WESTERN DESIRE TO HAVE TWO SEPARATE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF NEGOTIATION.

4. ALLIED REPS POINTED OUT THAT MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WERE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL WITH FIRST STAGE OF THE EASTERN NOVEMBER DRAFT AGREEMENT AS WELL AS WITH THE JUNE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, WHICH THE WEST ALREADY HAD

INDICATED WERE UNACCEPTABLE. THEY ASKED THE EAST HOW IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT COULD BE EXPECTED THAT THE ALLIES COULD CONSIDER THE PACT INITIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL TO BE EITHER NEW OR MORE ACCEPTABLE.

5. KHESTOV ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSION THAT, FOR PURPOSES OF THE INITIAL STEP ONLY, THE EAST HAD ESTABLISHED TWO CATEGORIES OF PARTICIPANTS--THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE SIDE, AND REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER. THE CZECH AND POLISH REPS ADDED THAT A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE, BUT THEY DID NOT INDICATE SPECIFICALLY WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND BY THE WORD "CONCLUSION." BOTH IN THE INFORMAL AND IN THE SOVIET OCTOBER 31 PLENARY STATEMENT, EASTERN REPS PRESENTED A REASONED CASE AGAINST COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE CEILINGS. THEY ARGUED THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT AS CONTRACTING PARTNERS, BUT RATHER, THAT AGREEMENTS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY ELEVEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOVEREIGN DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES AND THAT FOR ANY ONE OF THESE STATES TO REDUCE ITS FORCES WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO INCREASE THEM AGAIN WOULD VITIATE THE ENTIRE PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE EAST ALSO SOUGHT TO ADVANCE ITS FIRST STEP PROPOSAL WITH WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION BY RESORTING AGAIN TO PRESS LEAKS. THE UK REP (ROSE) SOUGHT TO PRECLUDE FURTHER EASTERN PRESS LEAKS BY CRITICIZING THE EAST DURING THE OCTOBER 29 INFORMAL FOR DIVULGING THE EXISTENCE OF ITS FIRST

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00376 02 OF 02 041143Z

20

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 IO-04 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /074 W

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P R 041005Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0576
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0115
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
USSALT TWO GENEVA 0007

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0376

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

STEP PROPOSAL AFTER THE OCTOBER 24 PLENARY.
NONETHELESS, POLISH REP STRULAK SUBSEQUENTLY
REITERATED THE EARLIER POLISH DEL PRESS LEAK IN A BACK-
GROUND INTERVIEW WITH A NORWEGIAN RADIO/TV
TEAM. THE SOVIET SPOKESMAN METICULOUSLY ADHERED
TO THE AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY RULE ON NEGOTIATION
DETAILS FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 31
PLENARY. HOWEVER, UPI VIENNA HAS SINCE CARRIED
A STORY QUOTING "EASTERN DELEGATES" AS SAYING
THAT "THE COMMUNIST PLAN MEETS WESTERN
DEMANDS THAT THE US AND THE USSR MAKE THE FIRST
CUT BACK...AND ALSO CALLED FOR EARLY FOLLOW UP
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00376 02 OF 02 041143Z

ACTION BY THE NINE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS."
THIS INFORMATION, WHICH IS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF
ANOTHER LEAK BY THE POLISH DEL PRESS SPOKESMAN, CREATES
THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EAST HAS THUS COME OVER TO
THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL. THE AHG APPROVED
PRESS TALKING POINTS TO HANDLE THESE AND POSSIBLE
FUTURE EASTERN PRESS LEAKS.

7. THE OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE DISCUSSED WITH THE
EAST THIS WEEK WAS GROUND FORCE REDEFINITION. KHLESTOV
REPLIED TO PRIOR ALLIED SUGGESTIONS ON THIS TOPIC
TOWARD THE END OF THE OCT 29 INFORMAL. HIS PREPARED
REMARKS WERE UNCHARACTERISTICALLY PRECISE, POSSIBLY
INDICATING THAT THEY HAD BEEN PREPARED IN MOSCOW
OR BY PACT MILITARY EXPERTS IN VIENNA. KHLESTOV
SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES FOLLOW THE LOGIC OF
THEIR OWN APPROACH AND REDUCE THEIR TOTAL FIGURE
FOR PACT GROUND FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR

SUGGESTED REVISION. HE SAID THE ALLIED WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD WITH GROUND FORCE DEFINITION IF THEY FOLLOWED THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND INCLUDED AIR FORCES IN THEIR REDUCTION PROPOSAL. KHLESTOV CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DEAL WITH FORCE DEFINITIONS AND DATA AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. US REP SAID IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO DEDUCT POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL FROM GROUND FORCE TOTALS IF THOSE GROUND FORCE TOTALS WERE NOT GOING TO BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS. US REP CONTINUED THAT INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD NOT ACT TO REDUCE OVERALL DISPARITIES CAUSED BY GROUND FORCE DISPARITY, BECAUSE TOTAL AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES WAS SIMILAR WITH A SLIGHT ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST. HE SAID THAT THE ALLIED DATA ON NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCES WERE SUBJECT TO CONTINUING REVIEW AND THAT RECENT REVIEW HAD INDICATED A SLIGHT INCREASE OF ABOUT THE SAME DIMENSION IN THE TOTALS FOR BOTH NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCES, THUS CONFIRMING THE SIZE OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00376 02 OF 02 041143Z

GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF BOTH SIDES. US REP CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS IN THE EASTERN INTEREST TO ADVANCE DATA OF THEIR OWN IF THEY DID NOT CONSIDER ALLIED FIGURES TO BE CORRECT.

9. KHLESTOV'S PRESENTATION ON THE FORCE DEFINITION ISSUE APPARENTLY WAS INTENDED TO CONCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC AT THIS TIME. BUT KHLESTOV AND OTHER EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE CLEARLY INTERESTED BY THE ABOVE REMARKS OF US REP ON THIS TOPIC, AND COMMENTED, AS THE SESSION WAS BREAKING UP, THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED MUCH "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" DURING IT.

10. AD HOC GROUP ATTENTION CENTERED THIS WEEK ON FUTURE NEGOTIATING TACTICS. THIS WAS PARTLY DUE TO THE OFFICIAL TABLING OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL, AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF REPEATED SUGGESTIONS BY BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSSEN FORMALLY TO DROP THE "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE FROM THE AGENDA, AND INSTEAD TO ADVANCE FOR PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES A "FIRST STAGE" APPROACH AS A METHODOLOGICAL "MIDDLE GROUND" BETWEEN THE ALLIED PHASING AND EASTERN FIRST STEP APPROACHES. ADRIAENSSEN CLAIMED THAT THE EAST HAD TAKEN THE OFFENSIVE AND THAT HIS "FIRST STAGE" DEVICE COULD BE EMPLOYED TO MOVE INDIRECTLY TOWARD DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING IN INFORMAL SESSIONS. AHG

DISCUSSION REVEALED NO SUPPORT FOR FORMALLY DROPPING
THE "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE OR FOR ENGAGING THE EAST IN
PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS TO FORMALLY CHANGE THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. INSTEAD, A CLEAR AHG
CONSENSUS WAS CONFIRMED FOR STEERING INFORMAL MEETINGS
TOWARD CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMON CEILING
GOAL AND ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, VIA CONTINUED
DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE REDEFINITION AND, IF THERE IS
TIMELY NAC GUIDANCE, NON-INCREASE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

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